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Equitable Considerations in Balancing
the Energy Equation
by William A. Thomas*
Decisions concerning how we balance energy supply and demand should not be made by quantitative
cost-benefitanalysesalone.Thedistributionsofcostsandbenefitsamongindividuals, groupsofindividuals,
nations, andgenerations raisequestions ofequity that need to be addressed forthrightly. Doing socan help
rather than impede the decision-making process.
Our generation certainly is not the first one to
experience problems associated with equating
energy supply anddemand. The problems now are of
greater magnitude, however, because ofthe greater
quantity ofenergy involved, the necessity ofconsid-
ering the relative quality ofenergy sources, and the
economic and political considerations encountered
indoing so. The expertise of many professional dis-
ciplines has been applied to these problems, and it is
not necessary here to recount the various failures
and successes ofthese endeavors. I wish in this brief
discussion to explore the concept of equity as an
additional topic to be considered in balancing the
equation.
Equity is that branch of philosophy and law that
deals with the distributions of costs and benefits
among individuals, groups of individuals, nations,
and generations. It would be an utopian society in-
deed -probably anunattainablefantasy -inwhich
each person's contribution to society equaled soci-
ety'sreciprocal contribution and inwhich any action
by society resulted in equal allocations ofcosts and
benefits among all persons.
Although these remarks constitute but an over-
viewofthistopic, itnevertheless seems important to
state some assumptions before proceeding further.
* Overall energy demands will exceed supplies if
we extrapolate data from the past several decades
into the future.
* Not all nations will use or supply energy in the
same per capita or aggregate amounts.
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* Our innovative abilities will not fail us, and we
will develop new energy sources and use existing
sources more efficiently.
* There will be future generations, members of
which will desire the widest possible range ofavail-
able options in allocating resources.
* Perfect knowledge about the consequences of
present actions is unattainable, but we will strive to
reduce the great uncertainties under which we often
act.
Each ofthese assumptions appears to be defensi-
ble, although no doubt some persons would prefer
that they be stated somewhat differently. At any
rate, I prefer to state assumptions at the outset.
Our methods formaking important decisions in an
increasingly technical world also are becoming in-
creasingly technical, as exemplified by the typical
cost-benefit analysis. Overlooking some philan-
thropic activities forthe moment, no prudent person
would invest time or capital if the anticipated costs
were certain to exceed the anticipated benefits. In
the customary cost-benefit analysis, all forseeable
costsandbenefitsassociated withaparticularcourse
ofaction are assigned monetary values. All present
and future costs and benefits are expressed in pre-
sent values and, ifthe aggregate benefits exceed the
aggregate costs, perhaps with a margin of error, it
generally is considered economically prudentto pro-
ceed with the project. Values for future costs and
benefits are discounted to the present by the oppo-
site procedure for calculating future values of a
known amountofmoney invested at a stated interest
rate. Forexample,$100investedtodayat7% interest
will yield $200 in about ten years. So, ifwe foresee a
October 1979 255benefitof$200 aboutten years from now, its present
value at a 7% discount rate is $100.
A straightforward cost-benefit analysis is a fine
analytical calculation that is appropriate for some
projects (or some aspects of a project) but not for
others. We mustrememberthat notall primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary costs and benefits can be as-
signed economic values. This uncertainty raises
manyarguments betweenopponentsandproponents
of any pa,ticular large-scale undertaking. For ex-
ample, generation of electricity in coal-fired plants
produces electricity and paychecks. but it also pro-
duces air and water pollutants that have various
long-term adverse effects. It is not at all certain how
we should assess these effects, let alone place firm
monetary values on them.
It is becoming increasingly clear that we cannot
concern ourselves merely with aggregate values or
their ratio. We should not be satisfied with the tra-
ditional utilitarian school of philosophy and eco-
nomics that promotes a societal goal of maximizing
total happiness or, as a variant, average happiness.
Utilitarianism does not concern itself with distinc-
tions among persons or among classes of persons.
Consider the following examples.
Is it fair that surface and subterranean water sup-
plies downstream from surface mines be contami-
nated so thatupstream landowners can produce coal
most economically?
Is it fair that underground coal miners work in
squalid conditions so that other persons can use
electricity for household appliances?
Is it fair that persons suffering from respiratory
diseases must involuntarily breathe air polluted by
the combustion of coal?
Isitfairthatthechemistry ofprecipitation in some
large geographic regions is altered significantly by
the introduction ofpollutants from tall smokestacks
in distant regions?
Is it fair that members of future generations be
subjected to climatic changes caused by carbon
dioxide and particulate matter in the atmosphere?
These are but afew ofthe equitable questions that
arise with respect to coal-fired electric generating
plants. Many others arise with respect to other ele-
ments of a national energy plan, not the least of
which is safeguarding nuclear wastes for several
hundred thousand years. Stating these questions is
not to argue against production of electricity or the
useofcoal as afuel butonlyto urge thatall costs and
benefits be considered in the decision-making pro-
cess.
Itdoes not suffice to brush these equitable consid-
erations aside by sayingthat coal miners do not have
to mine coal, that persons with respiratory diseases
can wear respirators or can move elsewhere, that
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technology someday will solve the pollution prob-
lem, orthat futuregenerations will learn to take care
ofaltered environments without any difficulty. It is
even less satisfactory to assign specious monetary
values to these costs and then churn them into the
traditional cost-benefit analysis, thus hiding the
problems of equity behind the facade of aggregate
economic analysis.
Questions concerning equitable relationship (i.e.,
"Is it fair ... .?") often are asked but seldom an-
swered, apparently because their formulators be-
lieve them to be so compelling that they need no
answers. Philosopher John Rawls recently outlined
an ingenious method for determining whether "it is
fair." (1). He asks us to consider a meeting of all
persons who at any one time (e.g., the present) will
inhabit our planet. The structure and function of
present society would be explained to all persons in
this "original position," as defined by Rawls. These
personsthen aregiventheopportunity tobeassigned
roles at random within present society. As Rawls
says, "The veil ofignorance is absolute." Now, put
yourself in this original position and ask yourself if
you would have been willing to have your role in
world society assigned to you by random lot. If you
had voted "yes," you would have voted for the
proposition that present society is equitable - that
you would have traded places with anyone else and
been satisfied with the allocation of costs and ben-
efits. I would have voted "no" and thus registered
myopinion thatwe live in aninequitable world. Note
that is is not necessary for all persons in anequitable
world to have equal access to resources or equal
obligations to bearburdens, but only that all persons
perceive that the distributions are fair.
The preceding discussion concerns what might be
called horizontal equity among persons or groups of
persons ornations. We also need to considervertical
equity - that which is concerned with obligations
among generations. Perhaps the best-known state-
ment on this general point was by Edmund Burke in
1790: "As the ends of[the social contract] cannot be
obtained in many generations, it becomes a partner-
ship not only between those who are living, but be-
tween those who are living, those who are dead, and
those who are to be born." (2)
Philosophers have pondered at length the wisdom
ofa generation making the world a better place for
distantgenerations toenjoy. As acommon metaphor
suggests, only the last generation lives in the com-
pleted house. Future generations can reward the
earlierones onlyby bestowingfavorable reputations
on them, but other exchanges from later to earlier
generations do not exist. Since nothing can be done
about this lack of reciprocity, it should not be con-
sidered an inequitable circumstance, and we may
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Rawls would have members of all generations
present at the original position agree upon how soci-
ety should be ordered over time. A key item on the
agendawould bedetermination ofwhatconstitutes a
"just savings principle." Eachgeneration would ac-
cept an obligation to set aside a specified percentage
ofcurrent resources for the sole benefit oflater gen-
erations. Members of the very early generations
might be asked to set aside very little - indeed,just
passing along sufficient genetic material might be
enough. Later generations, as the "house" is near-
ing completion, would be expected to set aside a
greater percentage ofwhatthey produced and inher-
ited. Again, all persons inthe original position would
be assigned randomly to specific generations. Ifper-
sons at this imaginary congress would agree on the
differential rates in thejust savings principle, no one
in the future could find fault with how past gen-
erations managed scarce resources.
As expected, the worlds of the philosophers and
the lawmakers are notalways the same. It is difficult
to think about a specific individual's obligations to
distant generations when individual genetic con-
tributions will be so greatly diluted. Perhaps this
explains why our legal system almost uniformly
favors the present over the future. Current laws do
protectfuture interests to some extentbyguarantees
of property law, for instance, but laws generally
burden future generations by promoting deteriora-
tion, exhaustion, ordisaggregation ofnonrenewable
natural resources. Tax laws, for example, and other
financial incentives promote "mortaging the fu-
ture," either by depriving future generations of
income-producing resources or by binding them to
commitfinancial andotherresources to satisfydebts
incurred today.
Although it is notdifficult to find some supportfor
bleak predictions aboutthe welfare offuture genera-
tions, reasons for optimism also are at hand. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was
enactednearlyadecade ago intheUnited Stateswith
the policy of"fulfill[ing] the responsibilities ofeach
generation as trustee of the environment for suc-
ceeding generations." (3). Environmental impact
statements are required by NEPA for all "federal
actions that significantly affect the quality of the
human environment." These free us in many in-
stances from the constraints ofthe cost-benefit ratio
by requiring that each statement at a minimum in-
clude a description of the adverse environmental
effects thatcannotbeavoided should theproposalbe
undertaken, alternatives to the proposed action, re-
lationships between local short-term uses ofthe en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources that would be
involved in implementing the proposed action. De-
scriptive prose, not mere quantitative measures, is
used to ensure that all defineable costs and benefits
areincluded inthedecision-makingprocess. Thefull
effects ofNEPA probably are not appreciated even
by its most ardent supporters. Other laws designed
to enhance the environment and conserve our
natural resources also are heartening and very well
could have long-term implications greater than cur-
rently envisioned.
Still, we can do more. Transnational equity re-
quires that we not impose on other nations those
costs that we choose not to bear ourselves. We also
need to work more diligently toward solution ofthe
"free rider" problems that arise when, for example,
some nations refrain from joining others in main-
taining global environmental quality, thus giving
them an opportunity to exploit common resources
while benefiting at the same time from the conscien-
tiousactionsofothers. We inthe United Statesmight
start by examining more critically how our dispro-
portionate per capita use ofworld resources affects
international cooperation in ameliorating transna-
tional equitable issues.
The United Nations in 1972 at the Conference on
the Human Environment adopted a declaration con-
sisting of a comprehensive preamble and 26 princi-
ples thataddress problems ofhorizontal and vertical
equity, among others (4). Following are three rep-
resentative principles:
"The natural resources ofthe earth, including the
air, water, land, and flora and fauna and, especially,
representative samples ofnatural ecosystems, were
to be safeguarded for the benefit of present and fu-
ture generations through careful planning or man-
agement, as appropriate."
"The capacity ofthe earth to produce vital renew-
able resources was to be maintained and, wherever
practicable, be restored or improved."
"The non-renewable resources of the earth were
to be employed in such away as to guard against the
danger oftheir future exhaustion and to ensure that
benefits from such employment were shared by all
mankind."
The first-come-first-served attitude currently
promoted inglobal resource development resultsina
race to develop resources for individual use before
the common supplies are exhausted. Recognition of
a problem generally is the first step toward its reso-
lution but, quite obviously, rhetoric alone is not the
solution.
George Stigler, anoted economist, once observed
in a somewhat different context, "In fact I believe
thateachgeneration has an inescapable obligation to
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solve - not only to spare that nextgeneration bore-
dom but also to give it an opportunity for greatness.
The legacy ofunsolved problems which my genera-
tionisbequeathing tothe nextgeneration, I may say,
seems adequate and even sumptuous" (5).
Most equitable questions do not admit of easy
answers, and it certainly is easier in the short term
to ignore rather than to address them. All in all, I
remain cautiously optimistic about our resolve to
solve ourpresentproblems witha minimum ofsocial
distress, either now orin the future. This we will not
accomplish merelyby increasing the energy supplies
tomeetanunnecessarily largeenergydemandnorby
unreasonably decreasing the demand and thus incur-
ring unacceptable social costs. We must strike a
reasonable balance between the two, and I therefore
am confident that we will.
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